

and unit equipment requirements have been met.

(5) A description of the criteria for assessing the capabilities and readiness of Iraqi security forces.

(6) An evaluation of the operational readiness status of Iraqi military forces and special police, including the type, number, size, unit designation and organizational structure of Iraqi battalions that are—

(A) capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations independently;

(B) capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations with United States or Coalition mentors and enablers; or

(C) not ready to conduct counterinsurgency operations.

(7) The extent to which funding appropriated by this Act will be used to train capable, well-equipped, and effectively led Iraqi police forces, and an evaluation of Iraqi police forces, including—

(A) the number of police recruits that have received classroom instruction and the duration of such instruction;

(B) the number of veteran police officers who have received classroom instruction and the duration of such instruction;

(C) the number of Iraqi police forces who have received field training by international police trainers and the duration of such instruction;

(D) a description of the field training program, including the number, the planned number, and nationality of international field trainers;

(E) the number of police present for duty;

(F) data related to attrition rates; and

(G) a description of the training that Iraqi police have received regarding human rights and the rule of law.

(8) The estimated total number of Iraqi battalions needed for the Iraqi security forces to perform duties now being undertaken by the Coalition Forces, including defending Iraq's borders, defeating the insurgency, and providing law and order.

(9) The extent to which funding appropriated by this Act will be used to train Iraqi security forces in counterinsurgency operations and the estimated total number of Iraqi security force personnel expected to be trained, equipped, and capable of participating in counterinsurgency operations by the end of 2005 and of 2006.

(10) The estimated total number of adequately trained, equipped, and led Iraqi battalions expected to be capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations independently and the estimated total number expected to be capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations with United States or Coalition mentors and enablers by the end of 2005 and of 2006.

(11) An assessment of the effectiveness of the chain of command of the Iraqi military.

(12) The number and nationality of Coalition mentors and advisers working with Iraqi security forces as of the date of the report, plans for decreasing or increasing the number of such mentors and advisers, and a description of their activities.

(13) A list of countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ("NATO") participating in the NATO mission for training of Iraqi security forces and the number of troops from each country dedicated to the mission.

(14) A list of countries participating in training Iraqi security forces outside the NATO training mission and the number of troops from each country dedicated to the mission.

(15) For any country, which made an offer to provide forces for training that has not been accepted, an explanation of the reasons why the offer was not accepted.

(16) A list of foreign countries that have withdrawn troops from the Multinational Security Coalition in Iraq during the previous 90 days and the number of troops withdrawn.

(17) A list of foreign countries that have added troops to the Coalition in Iraq during the previous 90 days and the number of troops added.

(18) For offers to provide forces for training that have been accepted by the Iraqi government, a report on the status of such training efforts, including the number of troops involved by country and the number of Iraqi security forces trained.

(19) An assessment of the progress of the National Assembly of Iraq in drafting and ratifying the permanent constitution of Iraq, and the performance of the new Iraqi Government in its protection of the rights of minorities and individual human rights, and its adherence to common democratic practices.

(20) The estimated number of United States military forces who will be needed in Iraq 6, 12, and 18 months from the date of the report.

Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I thank Senator DURBIN for bringing up this matter on the supplemental. I welcome the opportunity to join with him and our colleague from Michigan, Senator LEVIN, and others who support the amendment. As we have outlined, this amendment basically requires periodic reports on the progress we are making in training Iraqi security forces.

The Senate is currently debating an appropriations bill that would provide \$81 billion, primarily for our ongoing war effort in Iraq. This funding will bring the total U.S. bill for the war in Iraq to \$192 billion—and still counting.

All of us support our troops. We obviously want to do all that we can to see that they have proper equipment, vehicles, and everything else they need to protect their lives as they carry out their mission. It is scandalous that the administration has kept sending them into battle in Iraq without proper equipment. No soldier should be sent into battle unprotected. No parents should have to go in desperation to the local Wal-Mart to buy armored plates and mail them to their sons and daughters serving in Iraq.

Our military is performing brilliantly under enormously difficult circumstances. But they don't want—and the American people don't want—an open-ended commitment. After all the blunders that took us into war, we need to be certain that the President has a strategy for success.

The \$5.7 billion in this bill for training Iraqi security forces is a key element of a successful strategy to stabilize Iraq and withdraw American military forces.

The administration has spoken frequently about the need for these funds. But there has been no accountability. It is time to put some facts behind our policy, and that is what this amendment does.

The administration has never really given us a straight answer about how many Iraqi security forces are adequately trained and equipped. We're ob-

viously making progress, but it is far from clear how much. The American people deserve an honest assessment that provides the basic facts.

But that is not what we're being given. According to a GAO report in March:

U.S. government agencies do not report reliable data on the extent to which Iraqi security forces are trained and equipped.

It goes on to say:

The Departments of State and Defense no longer report on the extent to which Iraqi security forces are equipped with their required weapons, vehicles, communications, equipment, and body armor.

It is clear from the administration's own statements that they are using the notorious "fuzzy math" tactic to avoid an honest appraisal.

On February 4, 2004, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said:

We have accelerated the training of Iraqi security forces, now more than 200,000 strong.

Then, a year later, on January 19, 2005, Secretary Condoleezza Rice said that:

We think the number right now is somewhere over 120,000.

On February 3, 2005, in response to questions from Senator LEVIN at a Senate Armed Services Hearing, General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, conceded that only 40,000 Iraqi security forces are really capable. He said:

48 deployable (battalions) around the country, equals about 40,000, which is the number that can go anywhere and do anything.

Obviously, we need a better accounting of how much progress is being made to train and equip effective and capable Iraqi Security forces.

I am encouraged by reports from our commanders in Iraq that we are making enough progress in fighting the insurgents and training the Iraqi security forces to enable the Pentagon to plan for significant troop reductions by early next year.

On March 27, General Casey, our top commander in Iraq, said, if things go well in Iraq, "by this time next year . . . we should be able to take some fairly substantial reductions in the size of our forces."

According to the New York Times, on Monday, senior military officials are saying American troop levels in Iraq could "drop to around 105,000" by early in 2006.

These reports are welcome news after 2 years of war in Iraq.

April 9 marked the second anniversary of the fall of Baghdad, and in these last 2 years we have paid a high price for the invasion of Iraq.

America went to war in Iraq because President Bush insisted that Iraq had strong ties to al-Qaida. It did not. We went to war because President Bush insisted that Saddam Hussein was on the verge of acquiring a nuclear capability. He was not. Long after the invasion of Iraq began, our teams were scouring possible sites for weapons of mass destruction. Finally, last January, 21